Bay Bridge Bio

Are biopharma markets rational?

Biopharma stock returns have diverged from fundamentals over the last 15+ years. Investors reward pharma with rising valuation multiples despite deteriorating fundamentals, and biotech IPOs are priced consistently above intrinsic value (measured ex post).

It is tempting to frame this as a pharma problem: discovering good drugs is hard, clinical trials are expensive, Eroom's Law.

But in our opinion, this isn't a pharma problem. It is driven by the structure of financial markets and behavior of investors. Pharma companies are just playing by the rules set by markets.

There is a large body of literature explaining how biopharma stocks could be misvalued. This post will quickly highlight some of the key ideas from the literature.

This is not an exhaustive review. It is just a collection of papers that, in my opinion, explain biotech markets better than the Econ textbooks I studied back in undergrad.

This is not a pharma problem

The biopharma industry is not without its problems. Eroom's law, rising clinical trial costs, regulatory challenges.

But the specific problem of capital allocation -- which touches everything from R&D productivity, M&A and BD, and venture funding -- is not a pharma problem. It could just as well be an investor problem, or a problem with financial markets.

For example: we found that pharma stock returns from 2009-2025 were mostly driven by multiple expansion, and that in-house R&D contributed little to stock price growth, while ROIC steadily declined and R&D was well below the cost of capital.

That suggests investors were rewarding the sector with higher valuation multiples despite deteriorating fundamentals. Why is that? Is there something about pharma that has caused this? Are investors anticipating the industry's fundamentals will turn around?

It doesn't seem like it. Pharma multiple expansion over the 2009-2025 period is in-line with the S&P 500. Further, pharma returns over the period can largely be explained by systemic factors: investors did not treat pharma any better or worse than the rest of the market.

In other words, pharma stocks rose because the rest of the market did. The market didn't seem to care much about the underlying fundamentals.

We also found that biotech IPOs were overpriced relative to their intrinsic value, and that big pharma overpaying for M&A accounts for all of the excess return above the risk-free rate from investing in those IPOs.

That phenomenon cannot be explained by rising multiples or systemic factors, mostly because unprofitable, early-stage biotech companies don't really have valuation multiples, and their stock returns can't be explained by systemic factors.

But there are aspects of this that can be explained by the financial economics literature.

Why might biotech IPOs be overpriced?

What drives biotech IPO returns?

Annual return from investing in 439 US biotech IPOs, 2009–21, held to exit

-6%-4%-2%0%2%4%6%8%10%Cost of capital 8.4%Risk-free rate 2.0%-2.4%Fundamental return,bought at day-1 close+4.3 pts= 2.0% total,aboutrisk-free rateIPO pop+5.5 ptsM&A overpayment7.5%IPO investors’return

Pooled money-weighted return (XIRR) on the shares sold in each IPO, held to acquisition, failure, or 31 March 2026 (the analysis cutoff). "Fundamental return" values each acquired company based on the estimated discounted cash flows generated by its products, discounted at the biotech sector CAPM rate at the time. For acquired companies with no approved products or insufficient revenue data for approved products, the company is valued at its market value 42 trading days before the deal was announced. Source: Bay Bridge Bio retrospective DCF of 2009–21 biotech IPOs.

Our earlier analysis found that US biotech IPOs from 2009–21 returned -2.4% on a fundamental basis.1 The IPO pop brought the return to 2.0% (contributing +4.3% to returns), which is roughly equal to the risk-free rate over the period. Returns from big pharma overpaying in acquisitions of these companies contributed +5.5% to annual returns, bringing total return to 7.5% against an 8.4% cost of capital.

In textbook economics, informed investors would short an overpriced stock until the price came back down to intrinsic or fundamental value, i.e., the expected present value of future cash flows.

But that often does not happen in practice. The literature identifies several kinds of stocks that tend to be overpriced, and most of them describe a typical biotech IPO:

Further, IPOs and M&A are both transactions where prices can be biased upward. Companies choose to go public when valuations are high. In an acquisition, the winning bidder tends to be the one that most overestimates the target, and its managers can have their own reasons to overpay.

Importantly, *none of these are specific to biotech*. Most of the studies supporting these findings analyzed all sectors, not just biopharma. So we can expect these factors to cause overvaluation in other asset classes sharing these characteristics: venture capital, tech stocks, crypto, etc.

Select ideas from the literature

Opposing evidence

Why did pharma's multiple rise while its fundamentals slipped?

Pharma's multiple rose while it's ROIC declined and R&D productivity was below the cost of capital. The rise in multiple seems to be due to general market factors, not anything pharma-specific.

Pharma's multiple rose about in line with the S&P 500's over the 2009-2025 period. A factor analysis shows that a basket of big pharma stocks returned no excess return above what standard risk factors predict. This supports an explanation that pharma's rising multiple was driven by market-wide factors rather than anything specific to pharma. Essentially, investors value big pharma like any large, defensive stock.2

Specifically, big pharma's multiple expansion concentrated in 2010-2015 (the post-GFC period through the 2015 biotech bubble). Over that period, revenue grew 1.10x and the multiple grew 1.78x. This looks to have been driven by a broad rally in low-beta, defensive stocks broadly, not anything specific to pharma.3

But why did pharma grow with the market, despite deteriorating fundamentals? Several ideas from the literature offer explanations. In general, most large investors are long-only or long-biased. Further, passive index investing does not discriminate based on characteristics of individual companies. Additionally, there are limits to how much arbitrageurs can correct overpricing. So when more money enters the market, a lot of it goes to passive funds or long-only funds that bid up asset prices, and short-sellers are not able to offset this increase in price. Lastly, the "Fed put" since the mid-1990s has tended to support markets after declines, without an offsetting tightening when markets rise. If investors anticipate the Fed put continuing in the future, this pushes up asset prices independent of cash flows.

Of course, the multiple expansion could also be driven by investors anticipating future growth that is higher than that of the recent past. The multiple expansion could also be a function of a decreasing discount rate: the discount rate we used did not decline over the period, but the actual discount rate could have declined more than common methods for calculating the discount rate indicate.

Select ideas from the literature

Opposing evidence

Is this the best we can do?

Biopharma markets exhibit what looks like irrational behavior: overpaying for M&A, big pharma getting higher valuations despite deteriorating fundamentals, and investors consistently valuing biotech IPOs above intrinsic value.

Some of it is only irrational if we assume markets price assets based on intrinsic value.

But why do we expect markets to be rational in the first place?

Textbook economics describes people as homo economicus, making decisions based on rational self-interest. But decades of literature, theoretical and empirical, including an entire field of finance that has created multiple Nobel Prize winners (behavioral finance), call into question this view of humanity.

Markets may sort out some individual irrational behavior, the way that large samples smooth out noise. But a large body of literature calls into question whether markets price assets based on their intrinsic cash flows, and whether markets are rational all of the time.

If society's medicines are all developed through an industry that doesn't allocate capital efficiently, what should we do about that?

On the one hand, if that irrationality leads more money to be invested into R&D, that could be good for society, even if it is not invested efficiently. On the other hand, if investors don't need biopharma to be good at R&D in order to make money, there is little incentive to improve R&D productivity.

In any event, I think it is worthwhile to ask: can we do better?

Notes

  1. Fundamental return. The return from the closing price on day 1 after the IPO to the date of acquisition or the terminal date, valuing acquired companies based on the discounted cash flows generated by their products. ↩

  2. Big pharma’s returns look like any large, defensive stock. Fourteen large pharma companies, weighted by market value, monthly returns 2006–2025 (240 months). Eight factors together explain 43% of the variation. Total return 10.3% a year against 11.1% for the US market. From 2012, adding biotech factors shows a link to the biotech index beyond the market (loading 0.34, t-stat 6.5). The basket is today's largest companies, so it leaves out companies that were acquired along the way or shrank.

    ExposureLoadingt-statReading
    Market0.6911.7Moves about two-thirds as much as the market
    Size (small minus big)−0.32−3.4Behaves like large companies
    Investment (conservative minus aggressive)0.352.0Behaves like slow-growing companies
    Value, profitability, momentum−0.15 to 0.00under 1.3No reliable exposure
    Low beta (AQR betting against beta)0.131.2Weak
    Quality (AQR quality minus junk)0.201.5Weak
    Unexplained return+1.1% a year0.5Indistinguishable from zero
    ↩
  3. 2010–15: the re-rating rode a rally in defensive stocks. Most of pharma's multiple expansion happened in 2010–15. Over those six years revenue grew 1.10× and the multiple 1.78×. In that window pharma loads heavily on the low-beta and defensive factors. Same fourteen-company basket, weighted by market value, 72 monthly returns. The defensive factor is AQR's US defensive stocks portfolio; the global model is AQR's market, size, value, momentum, betting-against-beta and quality-minus-junk factors.

    2010–15 modelLoading (t-stat)Unexplained return, % a year (t-stat)
    Market only—+6.2 (1.7)
    Market + AQR US defensive0.47 (4.1)−0.5 (−0.1)
    AQR six factors, globalLow beta 0.75 (4.6)−3.5 (−1.2)
    ↩

References